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Roberto Gargarella has always placed distribution of access to political and 
economic power at the center of the analysis. This article focuses on his argu-
ment that participation might be able to improve material inequality. It argues 
that inequality can be confronted directly or indirectly, and that sometimes, 
participation is not the best mechanism for addressing inequality. The article 
draws on case studies from Japan and the Philippines to illustrate its argument.
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RESUMEN
Roberto Gargarella siempre ha colocado la distribución del acceso al poder 
político y económico en el centro del análisis. Este artículo se centra en su 
argumento de que la participación podría mejorar la desigualdad material. 
Sostiene que la desigualdad puede ser enfrentada directa o indirectamente 
y que, a veces, la participación no es el mejor mecanismo para abordar la 
desigualdad. El artículo utiliza estudios de caso sobre Japón y Filipinas para 
ilustrar su argumento.
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[E]ven though keeping within the bounds of legality, a few families might own 
the land, thus having the exorbitant right to render the whole of humanity tribu-
tary to their will by this monopoly. In other words: the fate of the overwhelming 
majority of humanity would depend on the goodwill of a very small minority, in 
such a way that the right to live, which is consecrated by God and which is the 
first of all rights, would be subordinated to the right to landownership, which is 
consecrated by whom? By man!
Joseph Charlier, 1848
Surveying Latin America over the longue durée, economic inequality has 
been a persistent fact in virtually every country, despite the region’s internal 
diversity. Today it remains the most unequal region of the world, even as there 
has been modest progress in this century. This profound inequality underpins 
Gargarella’s magisterial overviews of the history of constitutionalism in the 
region.1 His programmatic approach places distribution of access to political 
and economic power at the center of the analysis. 
Consider some basic facts: half of the twenty countries in the world with 
the highest GINI coefficients are in Latin America.2 With the exception of 
South Africa, the richest and largest economies on the list are all from the 
region, including Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. While there has been some 
growth in the size of the middle class this century, 30% of the region’s 
population still lives below the poverty line.3 And by some measures, such 
as the concentration of wealth in the top 1%, inequality may be widening.4 
1 gargarella, r. The Legal Foundations of Inequality. Constitutionalism in the Americas 
1776-1860. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010; gargarella, R. Latin American Con-
stitutionalism, 1810-2010. The Engine Room of the Constitution. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013.
2 undp. Humanity Divided: Confronting Inequality in Developing Countries. New York: 2013.
3 cepal. Panorama Social de América Latina 2019. Santiago: Naciones Unidas, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/44969-panorama-social-america-latina-2019
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The question for public lawyers and constitutionalists is what, if anything, 
can be done using our toolkit? From Haiti’s Constitution of Saint Domingue 
of 1801 to Chile in 2019, where a small increase in subway fares provoked 
a massive “social explosion”,5 Americans south of the Rio Grande have 
struggled to find a public law that can address structural problems related to 
wealth and inequality. The role of public law is summed up in the English-
language title of Gargarella’s 2010 book: The Constitution of Inequality. As 
he notes in a recent essay, “The constitutional model that still prevails in 
Latin America concentrates political authority in the hands of the Executive; 
seems ineffective from the viewpoint of political stability; is based on an 
unattractive approach to democracy; and does not contribute to the enforce-
ment of the numerous social, economic and cultural rights that it generously 
consecrates.”6 
This essay tries to answer the question of what public law can and cannot do. 
It uses an impressionistic comparison with East Asia, where in the second half 
of the twentieth century, broad based growth occurred that reduced inequality 
and expanded the middle class. This was, I argue, accompanied by a particular 
vision of public law. I do not assert that this vision was or is transferable, and 
it may depend on deep traditions of meritocratic selection that are unavailable 
in other parts of the world. But it does provide some information about the 
dynamics of change, and the role of constitutions in triggering it.
This essay is organized as follows. I first consider the role of the economy 
in definitions of democracy, recalling a recent debate Gargarella initiated in his 
review7 of my book with Aziz Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy.8 
Here, I partly surrender to Gargarella, certainly for purposes of the issue at hand, 
but I also see us as on the same side of a deeper methodological choice: should 
inequality be tackled directly or indirectly? Liberals like me and Gargarella 
both seem to prefer the latter approach, through which constitutional structures 
are designed to facilitate redistributive movements. Others, particularly in the 
4 There is a vibrant debate in the literature on the sources of inequality. Long-run explora-
tions attribute it to the colonial legacy, as if the genetic inheritance of Spanish colonialism doomed 
the region. But this is contested. Williamson (2015) argues that inequality was not particularly 
low in the pre-industrial era, and that it is primarily a feature of the 20th century. Luquerna (2017) 
agrees and provides thorough data. In the constitutional sphere, Gargarella (2010) points to the 
synthesis between conservatism and liberalism as a result of specific political struggles in the 
19th century, not the product of some deterministic inheritance from Spain.
5 caStellS, M. Explosiones sociales. In La Vanguardia. 2019. Available at: https://www.
lavanguardia.com/opinion/20191025/471186542407/explosiones-sociales.html
6 gargarella, R. Latin America: Constitutions in Trouble. In graber, M. et al. (ed.), 
Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, 177.
7 gargarella, R. Review of Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, How to Save a Constitutional 
Democracy, The University of Chicago Press. In Revista Derecho del Estado. N.º 44, 2019, 
397-406.
8 ginSburg, T. and Huq, A. How to Save a Constitutional Democracy. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2018.
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Bolivarian tradition, see constitutions are purely instrumental devices through 
which to accumulate power, and then force redistribution through illiberal means. 
The second section considers this issue of direct versus indirect confrontation 
of inequality. I focus on Gargarella’s mantra of participation, arguing that it is 
not always capable of achieving all he would wish.
The next section considers two Asian case studies in which “the social 
problem” was confronted in the 20th century: Japan and the Philippines. The 
argument is that the former confronted the problem indirectly through the 
constitution, while the latter took a much more direct approach. But Japan 
succeeded in overcoming stark levels of inequality while the Philippines did 
not. We then speculate, very tentatively, on implications of this comparison 
for a public law of substantive equality. 
1. DEFINING DEMOCRACY: A WHITE FLAG
Democracy, of course, is an “essentially contested concept”9 and scholars have 
identified hundreds of subtypes. My position is that the definition adopted 
should fit the scholarly problem at hand, and this seems to be Gallie’s own 
view: “politics being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised 
or lowered as circumstances alter”.10 As Gargarella notes in his review,11 Huq 
and I12 tend to adopt a thin and procedural definition of liberal democracy 
that brackets the economic question. I defend the choice in that context, in 
which our primary explanandum was democratic backsliding. A relatively 
thin definition, with fewer components, allows for comparison across multiple 
contexts, while adding components to a definition increases differentiation.13 
As citizens of a rich country with a large (if rapidly declining) middle 
class, we are perhaps predisposed to define democracy in a relatively thin, 
liberal sense: elections and the turnover of power, along with a very small 
number of core rights and the bureaucratic rule of law that are essential to 
enable those elections function. We could adopt an even thinner definition: 
Adam Przeworski14 says that elections alone are the definitional feature of 
democracy, while others add the core rights.15 One of our claims is that the 
bureaucratic rule of law is an essential part of any core definition, as it both 
9 gallie, W.B. Essentially Contested Concepts. In gallie, W.B., Philosophy and the 
Historical Understanding. London: Chatto & Windus, 1964.
10 Ibid., 186.
11 gargarella. Review of Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, How to Save a Constitutional 
Democracy, cit.
12 ginSburg and Huq. How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, cit.
13 Sartori, G. Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. In American Political 
Science Review. N.º 64, 1970, 1033-1053.
14 przeworSki, A. Crises of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
15 collier, D. and levitSky, S. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in 
Comparative Research. In World Politics. N.º 49, 3, 1997, 430-451.
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incentivizes peaceful transfer or power, ensures the integrity of elections, 
and allows the implementation of different social programs chosen by the 
people through their representatives. For our specific analytic purpose, a 
liberal definition of democracy seemed to be a good enough concept.
Gargarella argues that this thin definition will not do, and criticizes Schum-
peterian definitional approaches. Can the economic question really be bracketed 
in constitutional analysis? The liberal answer has always been yes—and this 
is part of Gargarella’s critique--but we are in a stage of constitutional life that 
the answer must be, for most countries, no. The reason is that power is not 
neatly segmented between political and economic spheres. Looking at the 
world’s heads of state today, I count a disproportionate number of billion-
aires, whose ranks include Pinera, Putin, and a set of at least nine monarchs 
in Europe, the Middle East, and Thailand. Even more importantly, consider 
the ability of wealthier citizens to have a larger voice in the democratic con-
versation. And this conduces to permanent exclusion of citizens at the lower 
end of the wealth distribution. As Khaitan16 notes, equality of liberty is a key 
precondition for liberal legitimacy, but when a group is permanently shut out 
of power, this legitimacy is threated. In his view, “Neoliberal democracies, 
sooner or later, become plutocracies.”17 Neoliberalism is not liberalism, to 
be sure, but rather a specific set of economic policies that might or might 
not be adopted by a democratic polity. But the large increases in the shares 
of top wage earners seem to be a structural feature of many countries these 
days. Hence there is a large challenge to liberalism, posed by neoliberalism.
Let us then add, as a definition of a normatively desirable concept of 
democracy, some degree of economic redistribution such that differences 
between rich and poor do not impede the ability of the latter to participate 
in politics.18 Adopting such a view for present purposes means that I am sur-
rendering to Gargarella in this definitional battle over the thickness of our 
concept of democracy. As we shall see, however, he and I are on the same 
side of a deeper issue about public law and inequality.
2. DIRECT OR INDIRECT? RIGHTS AS INSUFFICIENT
Adopting a thicker definition of democracy highlights the need for constitu-
tional structures to both empower and restrain economic activity, just as they 
both empower and restrain political power. This leads to the next question: 
how should this be done? Should the constitution squarely address inequality 
directly or indirectly? A standard liberal answer is to say that it should do 
16 kHaitan, T. Political Insurance for the Poor? In Global Constitutionalism. N.º 8, 3, 
2019, 536-570.
17 Ibid., 548.
18 anderSon, E. S. What is the Point of Equality? In Ethics. N.º 109, 2, 1999, 287-337.
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so only indirectly. Wealth should be regulated through the fiscal system, but 
that system should to subject to control of the political process. Whereas the 
private spheres of religion, property and conscience are to be constitutionally 
protected from majoritarian decision-making, the level of redistribution in 
any given society should be decided through collective political processes. 
This in turn requires facilitating a certain level of equal participation in the 
public sphere, itself necessary to get an accurate aggregation of the collective 
choice of the people. Inequality is addressed only indirectly: instead we need 
to ensure a transparent, fair political process, and then redistribution may 
happen through the ballot box. But of course, it may not, as some critics of 
liberalism have long pointed out.
Will indirectly addressing the economic question be enough? Progressives 
and radicals say no. Instead, they prefer direct constitutional intervention to 
reduce inequality. One standard answer from the constitutional lawyers’ toolkit 
is to provide an array of social and economic rights that can then be enforced, 
usually in courts, to improve distribution and restrain wealth. Alternatively, 
one could frame these social and economic policies as Directive Principles, 
which state particular goals for the government, not judicially enforceable. 
As Khaitan19 argues, there are many ways to incentivize redistribution other 
than judicial enforcement, including demanding that parliament issue an 
annual report on progress in meeting directive principles. Constitutions can 
also regulate property in quite detailed ways that anticipate some redistribu-
tion. An example is Section 25 of South Africa’s Constitution, a complicated 
provision which both protects property rights but also aims to undo prior 
dispossessions that occurred early in the 20th century, and to facilitate land 
reform. The Constitution also has non-eviction rights for tenants in Section 
26.20 Such clauses are examples of directly confronting entrenched structural 
inequalities, in a way that takes into account the political interests of current 
landholders as well. 
Surely this direct approach is also subject to criticism. There is a tempta-
tion in constitutional thought to act directly: to name the new social problems 
and target behavior toward them. But the limits of the constitutional form are 
very real. Constitutions are pieces of paper whose main mechanism of imple-
mentation is coordinated action by actual human beings and organizations. 
Social constitutionalism works, if ever, because of its impact on individuals 
and collectives seeking to advance claims. Where the constitution mobilizes 
people, they may be able to use its structures effectively. Where it does not, 
the constitution will remain a relatively dead letter, at least as far as redis-
tribution is concerned. And so, while the literature on social and economic 
19 kHaitan. Political Insurance for the Poor?, cit.
20 ginSburg, T. and dixon, R. The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic 
Rights as “Insurance Swaps”. In Constitutional Court Review. N.º 4, 2018, 1-29.
21“The Economy, Stupid”: Notes on a Continuing Conversation
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 49, mayo - agosto de 2021, pp. 15-33
rights has examples of successes, there is also much critical work about the 
failure of these pieces of paper to deliver meaningful change.21 
The taxonomic variation in Latin Americas constitutional history is a 
rich one, and full of solutions that seek to tackle the social problem directly. 
The Bolivarian constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela all provide 
examples in their own way, and arguably the first two had some success in 
reducing inequality, so that they are both in the lower half of South American 
countries along this measure. But it is also the case that the recent reduction 
in Gini coefficients this century has occurred in countries adopting diverse 
constitutional approaches, including Chile, Bolivia and Argentina. Gini coef-
ficients have remained stubbornly high in places like Mexico and Colombia. 
This divergence suggests that redistributive rhetoric and a powerful apex 
court are not enough to overcome deep structural inequalities. 
Latin American constitutions are distinctive for having more rights than 
those in other regions. Gargarella22 places great importance on the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917, and the coalition it brought into power, with long 
textual commitments to social and economic rights. This was a critical mo-
ment for the transition away from the liberal-conservative synthesis that had 
dominated the region’s approach in the 19th century. Gargarella identifies it 
as initiating the phase of “social constitutionalism” with long and elaborate 
lists of constitutional rights. These were later borrowed by other countries 
in the region, and in turn Latin America was the leader among regions of the 
world, adopting the American Declaration of Human Rights several months 
before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Mexican Constitu-
tion also devoted significant attention to the central issue of land, promising 
a program of land reform that was then realized in part two decades later.23 
Gargarella’s position on these rights is mixed. Even as he celebrates the 
Mexican constitution and the revolution in rights that it begat, he is still 
concerned ultimately with the need for enforcement from what he calls the 
“Engine Room” of the Constitution. As he notes, “constituents have demon-
strated a notable obsession with incorporating more rights, something that has 
not been matched by a similar obsession with improving—or changing, where 
21 uprimny, R. The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends 
and Challenges. In Texas Law Review. N.º 89, 2011, 1587-1609; langford, M. (ed.), Social 
Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009; cHilton, A. and verSteeg, M. How Constitutional Rights 
Matter. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
22 gargarella, R. The “New” Latin American Constitutionalism: Old Wine in New 
Skins. In von bogdandy, A. et al. (ed.), Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: 
The Emergence of a New Ius Commune. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 211-234.
23 grote, R. The Mexican Constitution of 1917: An Early Example of Radical Transfor-
mation Constitutionalism. In von bogdandy, A. et al. (ed.), Transformative Constitutionalism 
in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017, 149-170.
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warranted—the organization of power”.24 In that sense, Gargarella, like the 
liberals, does not think direct attacks on inequality are sufficient. He is not 
a Marxist and his answer does not reduce to economic determinism. Instead, 
in his writings, he has consistently emphasized the failure of institutions to 
deliver, and the inability of the machinery of constitutional democracy as 
currently practiced to encourage participation and to solve problems. His 
participatory and inclusive approach is an indirect solution, in which citizen 
connection to politics will produce fairer outcomes.
In this critique, one detects a visionary thinker, who sees, though does not 
fully describe, a world of political institutions that are responsive and vigor-
ous, that deliver a social order in which people live in dignity and participate 
in collective problem solving. Such a world might be achievable, but it has 
not been realized in this particular world, in this particular hemisphere, in 
these particular two centuries.
3. PARTICIPATION AS THE PANACEA?
Redesigning the “Engine Room” requires us to look at constitutional design 
writ large. Excessive centralization and concentration of power is a major 
problem. The single most important reform in the Gargarella framework would 
be a move away from the hyper-presidentialism, in which executive power 
becomes a massive prize and crowds out incentives for responsive politics. 
This call in turn suggests decentralization of power down to levels at which 
it can be exercised responsibly. Various experiments in citizen participation, 
from the cabildos of Chile’s ongoing constitutional reform process, to random 
selection of citizen assemblies in British Columbia and Ireland, illustrate the 
ability of institutional design to solicit input from citizens.25 Deliberative 
polling, developed and advanced by Fishkin,26 has been used all over the 
world, and he makes a strong epistemic case for its use.
But participation is no panacea. There are at least three reasons not to 
over-idealize. First, while the experiments in citizens assemblies and de-
liberative polling have been extremely interesting, and show the power of 
small groups to deliberate, it is not clear that they can become a regular or 
routine part of democratic governance. The Irish Citizens’ Assembly for 
example, was convened in 2016 to deliberate about major and controversial 
issues which had deadlocked the political system. Citizens deliberated and 
came up with proposals that were then sent to referendum. It is a great suc-
24 gargarella, R. The “New” Latin American Constitutionalism, cit., 224-225.
25 landemore, H. Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
26 fiSHkin, J. Democracy when the People are Thinking. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018.
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cess story. But the efficacy of such experiments might depend precisely on 
their episodic nature. It is well and good to call for ongoing participatory 
governance but it is not yet clear that people will sustain the interest. Other 
institutions of direct democracy, such as the referendum, were introduced 
as participatory innovations, but have found themselves subject to various 
abuses. In California, for example, direct democracy has led to multiple 
initiatives on various topics at the same time, and has induced the elected 
representatives to avoid their own duty of deliberating, sending questions to 
the public instead. Initiatives and referenda are subject to abuse, and in any 
case, we observe apathy, inequality and polarization even in societies with 
such constitutional mechanisms. 
Secondly, sometimes the public inputs are not particularly attractive. We 
are living in highly polarized times. Empowering the public to give their 
views and adopt popular polices will sometimes lead to unattractive poli-
cies. It will lead, in many countries, to the revival of the death penalty, for 
which public support far outpaces the elite consensus on abolition. It will 
likely lead to many policies that target or demonize outsiders. It might lead 
to policies that endanger the planet or call into question basic science. It 
might empower illiberal demagogues, whose cult of personality will inform 
the deliberation itself.27 
Third, these efforts may not easily scale up to the level of an entire coun-
try. Problems of aggregating public inputs in a decentralized system are real 
and genuine, and have received inadequate attention. Decentralization as a 
development strategy has had some genuine successes. But it is also subject 
to large variances at the national level as policy in different parts of a country 
looks different. Take the issue of regional wealth inequality, a central issue 
in virtually every Latin American country, in which wealth is concentrated in 
the capital city and lowland coastal regions, and remote highlands tend to be 
poorer. The economic forces producing such a configuration are well known. 
But will they be resolved simply by increasing citizen participation? The fact 
is that different regions of a country have different interests, and substantively 
different preferences about the appropriate level of wealth redistribution and 
income transfers. These clashes of interest are exactly the kinds of issues that 
political systems must resolve. Constitutional democracy with some genuine 
social and economic rights provides a way of minimizing the costs borne 
by the losers in this political process. But it in no way determines who will 
win the primary battle, which is where inequality is structurally embedded.
27 alba, D. and frenkel, S. Medical Expert who Corrects Trump Is Now a Target of the 
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4. ASIAN SOLUTIONS
How then, might we actually change the world? Can changing the engine 
room result in policies that reduce inequality and increase participation? I 
turn now to the experience of East Asia, which produced phenomenally suc-
cessful societies in the second half of the twentieth century. These societies 
experienced shared growth that raised incomes of the median citizens.28 As 
I shall show, participation in the sense that deliberative theorists promote 
was not a major element of the way this occurred. This section considers 
two different Asian countries that had to grapple with inequality: Japan and 
the Philippines. I choose these two countries in part because both confronted 
large problems of inequality, particularly with regard to land allocation, 
similar to what is faced throughout Latin America. Despite certain similari-
ties, however, the two countries chose very different approaches to tackling 
inequality. Japan largely relied on a model of liberal democracy of the type 
I tend to favor, where the Philippines adopted more participatory strategies. 
Japan is now a rich and successful democracy, while the Philippines remains 
poor and unequal. Indeed, it might be described as a Latin American country 
in the middle of Asia.
4.1. Japan and Land Reform
Postwar Japan has been one of the great success stories of liberal constitutional 
democracy. From the ashes of World War II, Japanese built a phenomenally 
rich economy and a democracy that has endured for 75 years. It is so stable 
as to be boring. The story of the constitutional founding, whereby a small 
group of Americans working for the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers, Douglas MacArthur, drafted most of what became the 1946 Consti-
tution in just a couple of weeks, has been told often and told well.29 This is 
sometimes considered the paradigm of the “Imposed Constitution”.30 Indeed, 
having outsiders write constitutions is no longer politically viable in an era 
of nation-states, though may have some theoretical advantages in terms of 
disinterest.31 Imposition allowed, for example, the introduction of gender 
28 World Bank. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993.
29 robinSon, D. and moore, R.A. Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese 
State under MacArthur. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
30 law, D.S. Imposed Constitutions and Romantic Constitutions. In albert, R. et al. (ed.), 
The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions. New York: Routledge, 2019. Imposed in this 
sense is different from what Gargarella (2018) calls “imposition” by one domestic faction of its 
views on another.
31 lanni, A. and vermeule, A. Constitutional Design in the Ancient World. In Stanford 
Law Review. N.º 64, 2012, 907-49.
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equality in a highly patriarchal society, a goal which has taken decades of 
social change to implement.
My interest is in how this imposed constitution addressed situations of 
profound economic inequality that obtained before its adoption. Prewar Japan 
had been capitalist economy, but dominated by a small number of industrial 
groups known as Zaibatsu. It also had highly concentrated land ownership, 
in estates that had accumulated in the early years of the Meiji era. MacArthur 
himself, in his instructions to the drafters, had prioritized ending the feudal 
system, which presumably included large land-holders whose tenants were 
in a subordinate relationship with them.
MacArthur’s administration was staffed with American lawyers who had 
come of age during the “New Deal” period, when social redistribution reached 
its apex in the United States. They were committed to the idea that govern-
ment could solve problems, and their diagnosis of Japanese society was one 
that Gargarella would celebrate, for they recognized that a concentration of 
economic power was incompatible with democracy. One of their immediate 
steps was to break up the Zaibatsu conglomerates and sell the shares to the 
public, in a so-called “democratization of securities.”32
In terms of agricultural land, Charles Kades, one of the main figures in 
the effort, proposed what became known as the “red clause” of the draft 
Constitution. This provided that all land ultimately belonged to the Japanese 
state. But this clause was immediately rejected by the Japanese government 
interlocutors who were to shepherd the draft through the newly elected Diet. 
From their point of view, nationalization of all land would be communistic 
and incompatible with Japanese society. But the idea of land reform was 
certainly present during constitutional debates.
The actual text of the Constitution says relatively little about land or 
redistribution. Article 29 on the right to property first states that the right to 
hold property is inviolable, thus eliminating communism as a viable form of 
economic governance. It then provides for a social limitation clause, namely 
that property rights are “defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.” 
It further provides for taking of property upon payment of just compensation. 
It is kind of a standard-form property clause.
However, with the encouragement of the Occupation authorities, the 
Government carried a major land reform of farmland, in which the price 
paid by the government was not the market rate, but a fixed formula based 
on projected future earnings of the farmers. Such an approach was neces-
sitated in part because of the lack of market prices in the particular social 
conditions of the postwar occupation. But by tying the government formula 
to farmer income, the Government took advantage of the fact that prices for 
32 kinoSHita, M. Democratic Economic Reform and Constitution: A Case Study of Japa-
nese Economic Reform after World War ii. Manuscript, 2020.
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crops were controlled by the Occupation authorities. In addition, there was 
high inflation. Thus the actual price paid to the landlords for expropriation 
was quite low in real terms. When landlords challenged the compensation 
as being unconstitutionally confiscatory, the courts rejected their challenge, 
in keeping with what would become a long pattern of judicial deference to 
government action in Japan.
Scholarly debate on the constitutionality of the land reform program was 
fierce. However, one prominent scholar, Sakae Wagatsuma, drew on what I 
might call a Gargarella-type approach to defend the land reform. “What is 
the ideal that runs through the new Constitution? Needless to say, it is the 
democratization of our country…. across all political economic and cultural 
spheres.”33 This makes inequality what Gargarella,34 following Alberdi, might 
label the “central drama” of the constitution. Noting that in a democracy, there 
would naturally be pluralist disagreement about specific policies, Wagatsuma 
went on the note that “with regard to the democratization of the economy, 
the meaning with which all people agree is obvious. It is that all people are 
able to gain sufficient fruits from their economic activities by their labor” 
with equal opportunities for enjoyment. In other words, Wagatsuma drew on 
the overarching principle of democracy to justify a confiscatory economic 
policy directed at redistribution.
The rest is history. Postwar Japan rested on a solid foundation of rural 
voters, who formed the backbone of the Liberal Democratic Party that has 
governed the country virtually uninterrupted ever since. The power of small 
farmers who were created by the land reform has grown extraordinarily. But 
the key point that the democratic constitution facilitated a one-time redistri-
bution which led to a society dominated by the middle class. 
It is worth noting that Japan in this period was a liberal democracy, but not 
one that drew on new mechanisms of popular participation. Electoral politics 
was vigorous but also the primary mechanism of public participation. During 
much of the period, key decisions were made in Tokyo. A communist party 
existed for the entire period but never had much electoral success.
The public law underpinning this story is one in which conventional 
development theory was not followed. The state, most scholars understand, 
played a major role in giving overall direction to the economy. Bureaucrats 
were relatively high status, and were given large amounts of discretion. Ad-
ministrative law was weak and empowering of “administrative guidance”, 
a practice in which bureaucrats could direct private sector action without 
33 wagatSuma, S. Nouchi-Kaikaku wa Kempo-Ihan ka? [Is Land Reform Unconstitu-
tional?]. M. Kinoshita (transl.). In Houritsu Times. N.º 2, 1948, 20-28. 
34 gargarella, R. When Is a Constitution Doing Well? The Alberdian Test in the Americas. 
In ginSburg, T. and Huq, A. (ed.), Assessing Constitutional Performance. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, 99-133.
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formal legal authority to do so. There was no administrative procedures law, 
and so little public participation in decision making.
The constitution, to be sure, did contain a wide array of rights. But many 
of these were implemented in ways that were fundamentally different from 
what the text (sometimes adopted from the US Constitution or that of Wei-
mar Germany) would imply. In particular, rights to welfare were not often 
adjudicated. The liberal rights of freedoms of speech and association, along 
with property rights were accepted. But there was not a thicker set of con-
stitutional requirements as one might expect. And the welfare state that did 
exist, which was modestly redistributive, was not grounded in constitutional 
law or major social movements. Judges were not defending social and eco-
nomic rights to any great extent.
In short, Japan’s is a story of transformation, and reduction of inequality, 
without any of the mechanisms of the new transformative constitutionalism, 
within a liberal constitutional democratic framework. And it worked. Indeed 
the period between the 1950s and 1989 was the greatest economic performance 
of human history, with the exception of China since 1989.
Of course, the context was very different than Latin America today. Japans 
19th century project of constructing modernity involved a homogenization of 
the populations, such that it was constructed as a single group without ethnic 
or linguistic difference. A sense of social solidarity was promoted actively, 
as a kind of “invented tradition” of communitarian harmony. Naturally there 
were indeed very serious conflicts, involving labor, land rights and gender, 
as well as debates over the proper role of the United States. But these were 
resolved amicably. Liberal democracy was sufficient to resolve the social 
problem in this context.
4.2. The Philippines and Participatory Democracy
The Japanese story can be contrasted with the Philippines, whose history 
is similar to and indeed entwined with that of Latin America. Claimed for 
Spain by Magellan in 1521, the country was governed from the Viceroyalty 
of New Spain in Mexico. An independence movement began in the 1870s and 
exploded in a full-blown revolution in 1896. With the Spanish American War 
in 1898, the United States gave initial succor to the revolutionaries, but upon 
Spain’s defeat, annexed the territory. This gave rise to a brief but bloody war 
between the United States and the Filipino revolutionaries. The country then 
became a territory of the United States. In preparation for independence, a 
commonwealth was established in 1935, with a ten-year sunset, but Japan’s 
occupation of the country in World War II cut that short. The country’s formal 
independence occurred in 1946.
Gargarella’s history of Latin American constitutionalism could apply 
fairly well to the Philippines. The social structure was highly unequal, and 
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the economic structure based in a system of haciendas, with rural notables 
owning vast tracts. American reformers, under the first Governor General, 
future President William Howard Taft, sought to implement a land reform, 
but this ran squarely into the opposition of traditional elites, who success-
fully mobilized their peasant clients against it. In short, the Philippines upon 
independence was a poor and highly unequal country.
After independence, the populist administration of Ramon Magsaysay 
ran on a program of land reform. Major progress was made under President 
Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965). However, he was defeated by Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1965, who then declared martial law in 1972. The next 14 years were 
a period of dictatorship corresponding with developments in Latin America 
in the same period. There were tens of thousands of acts of torture, and at 
least 3200 extrajudicial killings. Congress was closed, the media censored, 
and opposition figures harassed. Opposition figure Benigno Aquino was as-
sassinated at the airport upon his return to the country in 1983.
The major development in the current republic was the so-called People 
Power Revolution of 1986, known locally by the name of the street on which 
protestors gathered, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (edSa). The protests fol-
lowed a massive election fraud committed by Marcos, in which the opposition 
coalesced over Corazon Aquino, Benigno’s widow. Aquino’s government 
immediately adopted a transitional constitution, leading to the adoption of 
the current permanent Constitution of the Philippines in 19897. This consti-
tution features much progressive language and provides for several rights, 
but generally takes the approach of designating these as state duties rather 
than enforceable rights.35 It requires the state to undertake both agrarian and 
urban land reform programs.36 Notably it also gives constitutional status to 
civil society organizations, whose role is to be respected.37 A Human Rights 
Commission was established, with powers of investigation and the ability 
to provide legal remedies.
In short, the Philippines was well ahead of Latin America in pursuing 
the strategies of transformative constitutionalism. It had a genuine popular 
movement that transformed the country and led to the establishment of a 
redistributive, participatory constitution. But the results have been largely 
disappointing. Today the country has the highest gini coefficient in Asia; at 
35 See, e.g., Article ii, Sec. 9 (“The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order 
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty 
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising stan-
dard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.”) and Sec 15 (“The State shall protect and 
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.”)
36 Article xiii, Sec. 4-10.
37 Article xiii, Sec. 15 (“The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organiza-
tions to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate 
and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.”)
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44.4 as of 2015 it ranks around the same level as Bolivia and Ecuador. Other 
developing countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand, do much bet-
ter, with coefficients in the 30s. The economy looks a lot more like those in 
Latin America than its Asian neighbors.
A recent detailed assessment of the performance of the Constitution since 
1987 is sobering.38 It notes remarkable progress in establishing the institu-
tions of democratic governance, and the passage of inclusive legislation. 
Independent bodies ensure accountability and electoral integrity. The courts 
have frequently sided with civil society, labor and indigenous peoples. Fur-
thermore, there has been genuine attention to decentralization, one of the 
core goals of the 1987 Constitution, and this has produced a sense of active 
participation in local.39
But certain core goals have not been achieved. The Constitution seeks to 
prohibit political dynasties at the local and national level, but implement-
ing legislation to define the phenomenon has never been passed. According 
to Mendoza et al.,40 70% of district representatives in the 15th Congress 
(2010–2013) were from a political dynasty, and that these areas corresponded 
with worse development outcomes. Local politics are highly personalistic.
The current President, Rodrigo Duterte, is a right-wing populist who has 
overseen a campaign of extrajudicial killings that has surpassed even the 
Marcos era, but his targets are low level drug dealers rather than political 
opponents. While the Philippines seems to be a hyper-presidential system, 
it actually does exhibit some constraints, and there have been multiple im-
peachment attempts, with one President actually being removed for corrup-
tion. Several proposals to remove term limits have failed. So, there are real 
constraints on power.
Of central concern to our analysis, the “direct” constitutional strategy of 
demanding economic reforms has been ineffective. Quoting Atienza et al.:
[T]he impact of land reform on alleviating poverty has been only modest because 
of, among others, imperfect targeting and under-targeting of the poorest agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Some even contend that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program has made agrarian reform beneficiaries worse off and created an alto-
gether new class of ‘landed poor’. Many farmers are pushed to sell or mortgage 
their lands to commercial farms or other beneficiaries. There is thin compliance 
given that land reform legislations were passed in pursuit of the constitutional 
mandate. However, these laws are detached from economic realities, especially 
38 atienza, M.E.L. et al. Constitutional Performance Assessment of the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2019.
39 Ibid., 36.
40 mendoza, R.U.; beja E.L. Jr.; venida, V.S. and yap, D.B. Inequality in Democracy: 
Insights from an Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Congress. In Philippine 
Political Science Journal. N.º 33, 2012, 132-45.
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in the rural areas where people have shifted their attention from farm owners-
hip to overseas Filipino workers’ remittances as a vector of upwards social and 
economic mobility.41
It is obviously too much to attribute the persistence of inequality to the failure 
of a constitutional text. But I argue that it is surely relevant that a constitution, 
adopted three and a half decades ago in a country with very similar economic 
structure to that of Latin America, which gave full voice to aspirations for 
citizen participation, has not managed to overcome structural inequalities. 
That neighboring countries with very different constitutional traditions, such 
as authoritarian Thailand and corrupt Indonesia, have done better, suggests 
that participatory and inclusive politics are not enough to address economic 
issues. This should give us pause before adopting the Gargarella vision of 
participation as the solution.
Indeed, when contrasted with Japan, one implication is that external 
imposition might be the necessary condition to effectuate massive reform. 
I do not go so far, for such an argument is a sensitive one. But for present 
purposes, it is enough to point out that the “direct” approach to redistribution 
did not do as well as the “indirect” approach.
CONCLUSION
Asia and Latin America are very different regions of the world. But the two 
countries we have examined each had to confront profound inequalities in a 
democratic constitutional framework, and thus provide a lens to think about 
how the “Engine Room” interacts with inequality. Limited conclusions can 
be drawn from two case studies, but the paired comparison suggests that 
simply opening up the Engine Room may not facilitate systemic change. 
What Japan did was to create a middle class through land reform, which in 
turn made liberal constitutional politics possible. 
The “social problem” is an enduring one in constitutional though, going 
back to the Ancient Greeks. Relations among the social classes, and a consti-
tutional bargain among them, has been the central concern of constitutional 
makers ever since.42 But in many countries, including in the rich world, the 
“Middle Class Constitution” seems to be declining in favor of the concen-
tration of wealth in recent years. This means that we are all becoming Latin 
America to some extent.
41 atienza et al. Constitutional Performance Assessment of the 1987 Philippine Constitu-
tion, cit., 34.
42 Sitaraman, G. The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality 
Threatens Our Republic. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017.
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Or are we? There are examples of societies that have tackled inequality. 
The direct approach is favored by many constitutional thinkers, who argue for 
robust social and economic rights, directive principles, and land redistribu-
tion. Liberals, on the other hand, favor more indirect approaches, providing 
the structures of political competition, in which coalitions can bargain over 
the division of the social pie. Liberalism seems too thin to address inequal-
ity in an era of profound concentration of wealth, and Gargarella proposes 
participation as a solution instead. In this, Gargarella and liberals have some-
thing in common, namely that they recognize that politics rather than legal 
tinkering are the ultimate guarantor and channel by which inequality must 
be addressed. Direct approaches are insufficient without indirect approaches 
that change the political structure.
The contrasting experiences of redistributive land reform in Japan and 
the Philippines are illustrative. The latter’s program was constitutionally 
sanctioned, and has been reported to be ineffective. The former’s program 
pursued under the unusual circumstances of an occupation, which allowed 
liberal politics to take the fore. The landowners were simply too politically 
weak to interfere, and the result was a mainly egalitarian society in which 
most people were middle class. 
In short, a thicker conception of democracy, in which equality is a goal, 
cannot ultimately be implemented directly through constitutions. Instead, 
indirect mechanisms that involve the political process are the only way to 
actually tackle inequality. Rights might be a part of the package, but only to 
the extent they induce collective mobilization in the political process. Partici-
pation may be part of the package, but might lead to regressive results. After 
all, I write from a country in which large vibrant political movements are as 
likely to reflect populist demagoguery as they are progressive social reform.
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